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INVISIBLE UNTRANSLATABILITY AND PHILOSOPHY

KATHRYN BATCHELOR
The subtitle of the Vocabulaire européen des philosophies, 'dictionnaire des intraduisibles', links the publication to the issue of untranslatability that has accompanied discussions of translation throughout history; Andrew Chesterman even goes so far as to identify untranslatability as one of the five 'supermemes' of translation. 1 This problematization of the very possibility of translation, and the issues that it pushes to the fore, becomes particularly acute when considered in conjunction with another issue on which scholarly attention has recently focussed, namely that of translation invisibility. This latter notion -associated primarily with the writings of Lawrence Venuti -refers to the general tendency to overlook the fact of a text's translation; to read a text as if it were the original, and to ignore the inevitable differences that are introduced through the act of translation. In this paper, I shall outline recent thinking on the issue of untranslatability as it relates specifically to philosophy, examining the implications of the translation of untranslatables, particularly in terms of how the relationship between originals and translations is conceived. I shall also assess the extent to which invisibility is truly an issue in relation to translations of philosophical texts, and explore the inevitable dissonance that arises if a transparent relationship between philosophical translations and their originals is assumed.
Translation scholars have tended to align themselves into two camps with regard to their thinking on translatability. Some, such as Ortega y Gasset, writing in 1937, argue that translation is in itself impossible, by definition a 'utopian task'. 2 Similar lines of argument continue to be put forward by translation scholars today:
Paul Ricoeur, for example, devotes a third of his recent volume, Sur la traduction to the notion of untranslatability, taking the view that translation is characterized both by 'un intraduisible de départ', 3 linked to the inherent heterogeneity of languages, and by an 'intraduisible terminal', 4 the unavoidable betrayal operated by translation, and which means that translation should be viewed as an act of 'construction du comparable' rather than as restitution of meaning. 5 The second camp limits the notion of untranslatability to certain types of translation, or rather to the translation of certain The words which Hegel uses thus become part of the very process that is philosophy;
according to this view of philosophy, the philosopher should, as Inwood summarizes, 'watch words developing their own senses rather than arbitrarily declare that he intends to use them in such and such a way'. 12 This aspect of untranslatability in philosophy, which relates to the very process and manner of writing and has much in common with the untranslatability of poetic or form-focused texts, differs from the untranslatability of poetry in one important respect. Whereas the translation problems relating to poetry are usually confined to the translation of a particular poem, or set of poems, form-focused untranslatability in philosophy results in complex, multi-layered terms that often come to form important elements in the philosopher's argument, and are subsequently taken up and discussed by other philosophers. It is these terms that -in considerable part, at least -are the concern of the Vocabulaire, and for which Cassin coins the term 'un intraduisible': axiomatics of fidelity, one that requires attention to the chain of signifiers, to syntactic processes, to discursive structures, to the incidence of language mechanisms on thought and reality formation'.
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The type of translation approach outlined by Lewis and illustrated to some degree in Spivak's Of Grammatology can be said to go some way to 'translating' the process of philosophizing, re-enacting the creative and reflective paths taken by the original philosophers and which, as argued above, form an integral part of their actual philosophies. Inevitably, those creative and reflective paths will be altered rather than simply replicated. To some extent, alteration can be argued to be an inevitable part of 
